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Abstract
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welfare optimal tolling and investment. Welfare optimal tolling requires
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tra¢ c. We analyse the pricing and investment issue in an asymmetric
information setting where the local governments have better information
than the federal government. The case of air pollution and of congestion
are discussed.
Keywords: road pricing, federalism, asymmetric information, imple-
mentation congestion pricing
Author information
(1) Van der Loo: Department of Economics, Catholic University of Leuven, Naamses-
traat 69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium, (saskia.vanderloo@econ.kuleuven.be.
(2) Proost: Department of Economics, Catholic University of Leuven, Naamsestraat
69, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium, (stef.proost@econ.kuleuven.be).
11 Introduction
A standard result of transport economic theory is that e¢ ciency requires prices
equal to the marginal social cost (the extra costs to society associated with an
additional trip made). This result, however, is only valid in a ￿rst-best setting
and amendments to this simple rule are necessary in the presence of additional
constraints. This paper focusses on one particular second-best constraint that
has not yet been studied in detail in the context of transportation, namely the
presence of incentive and information problems regarding external costs when
there is more than one policy maker.
We know that when di⁄erent levels of governments have con￿ icting objec-
tives, this leads to uncoordinated and ine¢ cient pricing policies. These kind
of con￿ icting objectives can occur in the EU between the Commission and the
member states or within one country between the federal government and the
regions. While the upper level (EU, or country) is concerned with the welfare of
all the citizens and wants social marginal cost based pricing, a lower level gov-
ernment (a member state or region) may prefer much higher transport charges
to extract revenue from transit (this has been empirically validated for state
gasoline taxes in the USA by Levinson (2001)).
In a White Paper of the European Commission ( CEC, (1998)), the EU
indeed acknowledges that pricing of transport infrastructure should relate to
the marginal social cost associated with the use of the infrastructure, but the
current interpretation (for tolling roads) is to impose a toll cap related to the
infrastructure costs and not to the external costs. One of the arguments why the
EU can not impose ￿rst-best marginal social cost pricing is that it may lack the
necessary information about the marginal social cost of the di⁄erent member
states or that it is too costly to check the validity of the information received
from the member state. If this is the case, the member states with a high
fraction of transit users can pretend to have much higher external costs than in
reality or claim that their region is substantially more a⁄ected by the adverse
impacts from transport than the average. They can argue that their ecosystem
is very vulnerable (e.g. Alpine and Pyreneen regions or Omberg in Sweden (see
Sessa et al. (2009))) or that their urban planning is such that more people are
exposed to air or noise pollution than in other regions (e.g. Frankfurt airport in
Germany and Copenhague in Denmark (see Sessa et al. (2009))). Switzerland,
for example, claims that the damage imposed by road tra¢ c in the Alpine region
is on average a factor of 2 higher than for a ￿ at ￿ normal￿area (Maibach et al.
(2008))). There is in general no consensus on the magnitude of external costs
and large di⁄erences can be found in the literature. In this paper we do not
focus on the uncertainty in the magnitude of the external costs due to di¢ culties
of measurement or de￿nition, we do argue that how uncertain these values may
be, it is very likely that a local authority will be better placed to gather the
necessary information to estimate the real external costs and so will at least
have more accurate estimates than a federal authority. Alternatively, it can
have the legal presumption to know better the local conditions. When a lower
level government has a better knowledge on the distribution of some costs than
2the higher level government we have a problem of asymmetric information The
natural uncertainty on the magnitudes of external costs makes it even easier for
a local government to exploit the problem of asymmetric information.
In the ￿rst part of this paper we investigate whether a federal authority can
still implement optimal pricing under such asymmetry of information Under
asymmetric information the federal authority can ask the regions to report their
marginal external costs and implements pricing accordingly. We analyze the
problem in a very simple setting; one link crossing a single state that is used
by local and transit tra¢ c1. This problem is very close to papers that deal
with regulating ￿rms (i.e. monopolies) when the regulator lacks some crucial
information. Indeed, production costs are not always known by the regulator (or
it is too costly to acquire the information) but are known by the ￿rm. As a result
￿rms will set their prices at an ine¢ cient level to earn pro￿ts. In the case of
a monopoly several regulation schemes are possible (see La⁄ont and Martimort
(2002) and references therein) to minimize the excessive pricing, one of them
being the compensation schemes. In such schemes, monetary transfers are given
to a ￿rm which reports a low production cost in order to induce the ￿rms to
reveal their true costs. Since transfers are typically seen as a cost to society,
there will be a trade o⁄ between information revelation and e¢ ciency. The
policy maker will be willing to deviate from the ￿rst-best outcome in order to
reduce the information rent (i.e. the monetary transfer needed to gather the true
information). In our paper we make the simplifying assumption that transfers
are between governments and are, as such, not considered as a real cost, this
means that the higher level government will impose the ￿rst-best outcome and
there will be no trade-o⁄between e¢ ciency and information. On the other hand
we are concerned with transportation where the main external cost is congestion.
This externality di⁄ers in one important way from other externalities: the social
marginal cost depends explicitly on the level of use or demand and inversely, the
level of use depends on the externality. For other externalities such as pollution
or noise the level of the externality does not in￿ uence the level of use and the
marginal social cost is independent of the demand. The presence of a congestion
externality will alter the results signi￿cantly.
Transfer or compensation schemes are only one of the instruments available
to the federal authority to minimize the welfare losses due to ine¢ cient pricing.
The transfer schemes, if one exists, will, however, be able to reduce the welfare
losses to zero. Other instruments, such as, toll caps will perform less well but
have the advantage of being more easy to implement. In this paper two di⁄erent
toll caps will be considered: one where the toll cap equals the toll that maximizes
the expected welfare and the one used by the EU where the toll cap is equal to
the average infrastructure costs.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we analyze the ￿rst
best solution that can be achieved by an omniscient federal government that
has to deal with local air pollution or road congestion. In the third section we
1By restricting ourselves to one single country we neglect strategic interactions when transit
uses networks of several regions as studied in De Borger et al. (2005) and De Borger et al.
(2007).
3introduce a local government that has di⁄erent tolling preferences and focuses on
air pollution externalities only. Here we ￿nd that a revelation mechanism exists
that allows the federal government to make the local government implement
the ￿rst best pricing solution by a well designed transfer scheme. In the fourth
section we concentrate on the more di¢ cult case of congestion externalities. We
show that, if the transit tra¢ c share is su¢ ciently large, the federal government
is unable to set up a transfer scheme that leads to ￿rst best results. In section
￿ve we illustrate the orders of magnitude of the ine¢ ciencies associated to the
asymmetric information problem and of a toll cap equal to a toll that maximizes
the expected welfare. In the sixth section we generalize the model by including
road capacity decisions and examine the solution advocated by the EU for roads:
constrain the local road tolls to be smaller or equal to the average infrastructure
costs. The last section sums up our ￿ndings and adds some caveats.
2 First-best pricing
As a benchmark case we analyze the setting where only local tra¢ c is present.
When only local tra¢ c is present and neglecting political economy issues, both
federal and local government will have the same objective and we get the stan-
dard ￿rst-best results. We discuss ￿rst the case of air pollution and then con-
gestion.
2.1 Air pollution
We use a partial equilibrium model to analyze pricing decisions of a single
(isolated) link crossing a country (or region). In this section there is only one
kind of user, namely local users. The usage is denoted by XL. In order to get
explicit analytical results, we assume that the usage is determined by a linear






= aL ￿ bLXL; aL > 0;bL > 0: (1)
The objective function of both governments (local and federal) is the sum of the






PL (x)dx ￿ ￿XL + ￿XL ￿ eXL (2)
where ￿ is the toll levied on transportation, e the constant marginal external
cost of one unit of XL. Important in our analysis is that the marginal external
cost is constant, does not a⁄ect the level of usage and has a purely local impact.
Local air pollution damage could be an example, accident externalities imposed
by cars on cyclists and pedestrians could be another.
In equilibrium, demand will be equal to the user cost. As we neglect here
the other private resource costs, the user cost consists of the toll only. The
4equilibrium volume is then given by XL (￿) = aL￿￿
bL . An increase (or decrease)







Both local and federal government will choose ￿ such as to maximize the social














Using eq(1) and eq(3), the optimal toll is equal to the marginal environmental
damage:
￿￿ = e:
As the marginal air pollution damage is constant, the Pigouvian tax solution is
very simple.
2.2 Congestion
In the case of congestion, the marginal external cost depends on the usage level
of the infrastructure. The user cost now equals the toll plus the time cost,
where the time cost is an increasing function of the usage. The time cost and
the discomfort of travel will in principle increase when a higher volume is loaded
on the same infrastructure: average speed will decrease, in the train, passengers





= ￿ + ￿XL + ￿; ￿ > 0;￿ > 0: (4)
The objective function for both local and federal government is the sum of the
surplus of the users minus the user cost (￿rst two terms in eq(4)), plus the tax





PL (x)dx ￿ C
￿
XL￿
XL + ￿XL: (5)









aL ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ + bL
: (6)
Contrarily to the case of air pollution, the level of congestion will now a⁄ect the
level of usage (feedback e⁄ect). If the infrastructure is more easily congestible,
2The linear demand function ensure us that the second order conditions for a maximum
are ful￿lled and will not mention them in the rest of the chapter unless needed.
3The linear user cost function could be seen as the reduced form cost function of a simple
bottleneck model with homogeneous users Arnott et al. (1993).








Again the governments will maximize the social welfare (now given by eq(5))
























￿￿ = ￿XL: (8)
As expected, the more congestible the infrastructure (the higher ￿), the higher




bL (aL ￿ ￿)
(2￿ + bL)
2 > 0:
3 Enforcing marginal social cost pricing when
air pollution is the only externality
Introducing transit tra¢ c will create a divergence between local and federal
government objectives. Transit tra¢ c is tra¢ c by residents of another locality
belonging to the federation. In order to concentrate on the asymmetric informa-
tion issue we neglect the strategic interactions when transit tra¢ c uses networks
of several regions as studied in De Borger et al. (2005) and De Borger et al.
(2007). The local government maximizes the surplus of the local users plus
the revenue it can extract from transit. The federal government is interested
in maximizing welfare of all users and wants therefore to control the tolling
practices of the local government. To emphasize the di⁄erence in local decision
making when transit tra¢ c is present or not we ,￿rst analyze the case where
there is only transit tra¢ c and generalize later to the case of transit and local
tra¢ c. As the type of external cost is crucial for the enforcement of ￿rst best
pricing, we ￿rst focus on air pollution.
3.1 The case of only transit tra¢ c
The local government collects the tolls paid by the transit users and is not
interested in their welfare. Its objective function is therefore equal to the total
toll revenue minus the (local) external cost caused by the tra¢ c:
￿ = (￿ ￿ e)XT; (9)
6where ￿ is the toll, e the constant marginal external cost and XT the transit
volume. The demand function for transit is assumed similar to that of local




= aT ￿ bTXT; aT;bT > 0: (10)
The federal government, on the other hand, is concerned by the welfare of all
citizens, including the transit users and will maximize an objective function
similar to eq(2) where XL is now replaced by XT: The optimal toll from a
federal point of view will therefore be again equal to the Pigouvian tax, namely
￿￿ = e:
3.1.1 The toll preferred by the local government
The local authority will charge a toll ￿N to the users of the facility that maxi-
mizes its welfare given in eq(9). This toll will solve the ￿rst order condition for
￿ which is









The toll increases with the marginal environmental damage. In fact the mar-
ginal environmental damage can be considered as a marginal cost for the local
government. The toll charged by the local government ￿N exceeds the social
marginal cost because the local government is able to raise revenues by charging
transit users,
￿N > e = ￿￿:
Note that we need aT > e to ensure XT > 0; the maximum willingness to pay
for usage of the infrastructure must be at least the damage caused by usage.













which is negative since aT > e : the higher the damage cost, the lower the local
welfare. When e = aT, then the local welfare is zero.
73.1.2 Federal toll regulation with asymmetric information
We now suppose that the marginal environmental damage e is unknown to




or a high one
￿
e = eH > eL￿
. This uncertainty
is not unrealistic. Some regions pretend their ecosystem is very vulnerable or
that their urban planning is such that more people are exposed to air pollution
than in other regions.
The game is the following: in the ￿rst stage, the regional government reports
its marginal environmental cost ~ ei 2
￿
eL;eH￿
to the federal government. In the
second stage, the federal government imposes a toll contingent on this report.
To ensure truthful reporting we assume that the federal government can make




that a region always has the incentive to report its true marginal damage, i.e.
the incentive constraints are satis￿ed. Note that this problem is similar to the
problem of regulating a monopoly with unknown costs (see Baron and Myerson
(1982)) but since we assume that the monetary transfers do not represent a real
cost to society there will be no trade o⁄ between e¢ ciency and paying "infor-
mation rents". Whereas in the classic principal-agent problem the principal will
be willing to deviate from the e¢ cient outcome in order to pay less rent, here
the principle (in casu the federal government) will always implement the ￿rst
best tolls. Our aim is to check whether it is possible for the federal government
to implement ￿rst-best tolls while ensuring truthful reporting.
The lower level government, knowing that it will have to charge a toll equal
to its reported marginal damage, will choose to report a marginal damage ~ ei







~ ej ￿ ei￿
XT ￿








being the local welfare for a region with marginal damage ei; reporting




is such that it is bene￿cial for a region to report its true marginal




= 0 and M
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~ eL￿
= M (M can in principle be negative) and















These are the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. The ￿rst constraint
ensures that a region whose true marginal damage is high will prefer to report a
high marginal damage ~ eH and receive no ￿nancial transfer rather than to lie and
report a low marginal damage and receive M: The second constraint ensures in
the same way that a region with a low marginal damage will have no incentive
to misreport its marginal damage.
8Let us ￿rst look at the behavior of the local authority when there are no
transfers. A region with low marginal damage will have an incentive to mis-
report its damage because it can increase its welfare by pretending to have








. A region with high mar-







. This is easily seen in 1.where ￿I (￿);I = L;H stands
for the local welfare of a region with low/high marginal cost.
Figure 1: Local welfare functions with air pollution and only transit tra¢ c.
In order for a region with a low marginal damage to tell the truth, it must
be compensated with a ￿nancial transfer. The lowest transfer needed to induce



















This is always true since eH > eL; which leads to the ￿rst proposition:
Proposition 1 When there is only transit tra¢ c and when the environmental
damage is unknown to the federal government, the federal government can still
implement the ￿rst-best tolls. For a region with low environmental damage eL







9When the di⁄erence between the two marginal damages is large, the greater
is the gain for a low damage region to pretend to have a high marginal damage
and the larger the compensation for truthtelling needs to be.
If a transfer is not possible, the federal government could impose a cap on









where p is the probability of a low mecc. The cap will then be equal to the
expected environmental damage:
￿￿E = PeL + (1 ￿ P)eH
If this toll cap is set, a region with high mecc will always select a toll equal
to the cap since ￿￿E < ￿￿H < ￿NH but note that in this case a region with
high environmental cost will end up with a negative welfare and may prefer an
extreme solution like closing down the road.
3.2 The case with transit and local tra¢ c
When there is both local and transit tra¢ c, the local government will only be
concerned about the welfare of the local users and the revenues generated by
the transit users. Its objective function is the sum of the surplus of the local





PL (x)dx ￿ ￿XL + (￿ ￿ e)X; (13)
where X = XT + XL; the total amount of users. The federal government, on









PT (x)dx ￿ ￿X + (￿ ￿ e)X:
The federal ￿rst-best toll is again ￿￿ = e:
3.2.1 The toll preferred by the local government
Solving the ￿rst order condition of (13) with respect to ￿ yields the preferred
toll ￿N, which is of the form






@￿ in the expression for ￿N we get a toll level that is excessive:
￿N = e +
bLbT
bL + bT
XT > ￿￿: (14)
10Moreover, the more transit users there are, the higher the locally preferred toll
will be. Note that the presence of local users will partly protect the transit users
of being excessively tolled since bT > bLbT
bL+bT and the toll levied when no local
users are present will be even higher.
3.2.2 Federal toll regulation with asymmetric information
As in the case when there was only transit tra¢ c, we now assume that the
environmental damage is only known to the local government. Again the local
government reports a marginal damage costs ~ ei 2
￿
eL;eH￿
: Doing so it will have




zero for ~ ei = eH and equal to M when ~ ei = eL: We saw that a region with high
environmental damage will charge a toll that is higher than the corresponding
marginal damage, which on its turn is larger than the ￿rst-best toll for low
environmental damage:
￿NH > ￿￿H > ￿￿L;
where ￿￿i ￿ ￿￿ ￿
ei￿
;i = L;H and ￿Ni ￿ ￿N ￿
ei￿
;i = L;H. The local objective
function is a parabolic function of the toll with a maximum for ￿NH = ￿N ￿
eH￿
,
which implies that for a region with a high environmental damage there will be








Graphically, we have the following situation








In 2 we see that whether region with low damage will have an incentive to lie
when no transfers are available depends on the relative position of the ￿rst-best
toll in case of high damage
￿
￿￿H￿
and the locally preferred toll for low damage ￿
￿NL￿
. We can show that when the locally preferred toll satis￿es following
inequality




then a low damage region will never have an incentive to lie about its marginal
damage cost and the federal government can implement ￿rst best tolls without
having to make any transfers, i.e. M = 0: Since the deviation of the locally
preferred toll from the ￿rst-best toll depends on the volume of transit (see
eq(14)), this inequality tells us that if transit tra¢ c is not very important,
then a low damage region will never have an incentive to lie about its marginal
damage cost. If transit tra¢ c is important enough, however, a region with low
damage costs will have to be compensated in order to report truthfully, the






. This transfer could in
principle induce a high damage region to mimic a low damage region in order
11Figure 2: Local air pollution case: Local welfare with both local as transit users.
12to receive the transfers. It is, however, easy to check that the IC constraints for















which is always the case since by assumption eH > eL:
Proposition 2 When there is both local and transit tra¢ c and the marginal
environmental damage is unknown to the federal government, a truthful mecha-











no compensation is needed i.e. M = 0,
if this condition is not satis￿ed, then a ￿nancial compensation is needed in
order to induce a "low cost" region to report its cost truthfully. This compensa-













The larger the uncertainty on the marginal damage cost, the larger the
di⁄erence between the two ￿rst-best tolls. For a low damage region to be willing
to pretend to have a high marginal cost (and thus constraint to charge the ￿￿H;
the ￿rst-best toll given that the region has a high damage cost) it will need a lot
of extra revenues from transit to compensate the loss of local consumer surplus
loss. This will only be the case if there is a large fraction of transit. Conversely,
the less transit there is, the less likely that any monetary compensation will be
needed to induce truthful reporting.
As was the case where there was only transit, the toll that maximizes ex-
pected welfare from the federal point of view when no compensation can be paid
is the expected environmental damage.
4 Enforcing marginal social cost pricing when
congestion is the only externality
4.1 The case of only transit tra¢ c
In the following sections we assume that congestion is the only externality
present. A distinctive feature of congestion is that it, contrarily to external-
ities discussed in the previous sections, it a⁄ects the users of the infrastructure
and will in￿ uence the demand levels. The local government is not interested
13in the welfare of the transit users, it will only be interested in the congestion
costs of transit users in as far as they a⁄ect transit demand and the toll rev-
enues. When only transit users are present the objective function of the local
government is therefore very simple: it is equal to the total toll revenue
￿ = ￿XT; (15)
where ￿ is the toll and XT the transit volume. The federal ￿rst-best toll is
￿￿ = ￿XT (see eq(8)).
4.1.1 The toll preferred by the local government





the toll is independent of the congestion level. The local welfare will however

















2 < 0: (17)
4.1.2 Federal toll regulation with asymmetric information
In this section we suppose that the federal government is not well informed
about the marginal external costs of congestion. Again this is not an unrealistic
assumption. The marginal external cost depends on values of time (so on com-
position of tra¢ c). It also consists of schedule delay costs (see Arnott et al. [1])
so that observations on the length of queues etc. are insu¢ cient information.
The lack of information concerns the slope of the average user cost function, or
more precisely, the parameter ￿: We assume that the federal government only
knows that the slope of the user cost function can be either ￿ = ￿




L: The larger the parameter ￿, the more easily congestible is the
infrastructure and so we will refer to a region with ￿ = ￿
L as a region with "low
marginal external congestion cost (mecc)" and to a region with ￿ = ￿
H as a
region with "high mecc". As was the case in section 3.3.1 we will check whether
with the help of ￿nancial transfers, it is possible to implement the ￿rst-best
outcome.







such that it maximizes its welfare taking into account that it will be














































; the ￿rst-best toll given that the mecc is
equal to the ~ ￿
j








= M , where































When no transfers are available, we can see in Figure 3 that a country with a
low mecc will have an incentive to misreport its mecc. On the other hand,















> 0: A country with low mecc will need to
















Figure 3: Local welfares for di⁄erent road congestibility and tolls.
In Figure 3 we see that for an identical toll, the toll revenues of a region with
low mecc will be higher than for a region that has a more easily congestible in-











for all ￿: Both welfare functions will be equal to zero when ￿ is 0 or











































where the equality on the right-hand side only holds when the left-hand side
holds for equality. This property holds for every ￿1 and ￿2 and thus also for
the special case where ￿1 = ~ ￿
L
and ￿2 = ~ ￿
H
and we see that there is a con￿ ict
with the IC constraints. This means that the federal government will not be
able to ￿nd a transfer scheme that induces a region to declare its true mecc
and implement the corresponding ￿rst-best toll, even if it has access to ￿nancial
transfers. In fact the result holds for any pair of tolls and ￿nancial transfers M;
and the federal government will never be able to induce a truthful report of the
mecc. Note that the major di⁄erence with the air pollution type of externalities
is that there the second derivative of the local welfare is constant. This di⁄erence
re￿ ects the fact that congestion has an in￿ uence on the demand levels, while air
pollution does not.
Proposition 3 When there is only transit tra¢ c and the marginal external cost
of congestion (mecc) is unknown to the federal government, no truthful mech-
anism exists that allows the federal government to implement marginal social
cost pricing.
In this case, when the federal government does not know whether the region
has a low or high cost, it will not be able to impose ￿rst best tolling. One
possibility is that it imposes a toll cap equal to the toll that would maximize
the expected welfare. As long as this toll is inferior to the locally preferred toll,
each region will choose to implement the cap.











































:It is easy to see that
￿￿E < ￿￿H:
Since ￿￿H < ￿N independently of the mecc of the region, when this toll cap is
imposed the local government will charge a toll equal to ￿￿E:
164.2 The case with transit and local tra¢ c
When there are also local users, the welfare function of the local government






PL (x)dx ￿ C (X)XL + ￿X: (19)
In contrast, the federal government will also take into account the user surplus









PT (x)dx ￿ C (X)X + ￿X:
Equating the demand functions for transit and local users (equations eq(10) and
eq(1) respectively) to the linear user cost function similar to eq(4), yields us the
transit and local volumes in function of the mecc and the toll. Deriving the













where B ￿ ￿ (bL + bT) + bLbT: As expected, both user volumes decrease when
the toll increases.
4.2.1 The toll preferred by the local government
We obtain an expression for the locally preferred toll by solving the f.o.c. with
respect to ￿ of eq(19):








The toll exceeds the local marginal external cost, de￿ned as the marginal ex-
ternal cost imposed on the locals, and the more transit there is, the larger will
be the di⁄erence between the locally preferred toll and the federal optimal toll
(see De Borger et al. [?])
Substituting @X
@￿ in the expression of ￿N we get





￿N > ￿X (￿;￿) = mecc. (21)
17The toll charged by the local government exceeds the social marginal cost4.



















4.2.2 Federal toll regulation with asymmetric information






is unknown by the
federal government.
Figure 4: Local welfares for di⁄erent congestion functions when there is local
and transit tra¢ c.
4Note that the volumes are, however, the volumes for ￿ = ￿N and not the ￿rst-best
volumes. It can be shown that the ￿rst-best toll is lower than the locally preferred toll
whenever ￿ (bT + bL) + bTbL > 0, which is always the case.
18We see in Figure 4 that, as usual, a region with high mecc never has an














; but a country with low mecc
will in some cases have an incentive to lie when no transfers exists. Similarly to
the case of air pollution type of externalities, when
￿￿H > 2￿NL ￿ ￿￿L;





















where A ￿ aTbL +aLbT ￿(bT + bL)￿ (for the derivation see Appendix). When
there is an incentive for a low mecc region to mimic a region with high mecc, we
will again have cases where the monetary transfers needed to induce truthtelling
will be such that the IC for a high mecc region will be violated. This will happen
when the share of transit is relatively high (in the next section we will show
that for some parameters this will already be the case when half of the tra¢ c
is transit.). In other words; only when the transit share is small enough, the
regions will declare their true mecc. If the transit share is larger, a region with
low mecc will have an incentive to overstate its mecc.and compensation will be
needed. When the share of transit is large, this compensation will induce a high
mecc region to declare it has low mecc and it is impossible to implement the
￿rst-best outcome.
Proposition 4 When there is both local and transit tra¢ c and the marginal
external congestion cost is unknown to the federal government, there are three
cases
1. conditions (22) is satis￿ed: the federal government can set the toll equal
to the mecc corresponding to the declared ￿
2. condition (22) is not satis￿ed but the share of transit is relatively low:
the federal government can set toll equal to the mecc corresponding to the
declared ￿ but needs to make a ￿nancial transfer if a region declares it has
a low mecc
3. condition (22) is not satis￿ed and the share of transit is relatively high:
no mechanism exists where the federal government can induce a region to
report its mecc truthfully and impose the corresponding ￿rst-best toll.
5 Numerical Example
This section illustrates the results using a numerical example. In this exam-
ple we put the maximum willingness to pay for any type of tra¢ c equal to 5
(aL = aT = 5): The demand functions are calibrated such that the total volume
19of tra¢ c is equal to unity when the generalized price (without congestion) is
equal to unity. The relative share of local and transit demand translates into
di⁄erent slopes of the aggregate local and transit demand functions: bL = ￿bT:
For ￿ < 1 the share of transit will be inferior to that of local tra¢ c, for ￿ > 1
the opposite is true. The values and probabilities5 for the marginal external
costs are:
eL eH ￿L ￿H
value 1 3:5 0:5 3
probability 0:8 0:2 0:8 0:2
Table 1: Marginal external costs and the probabilities
We will consider four scenarios: (i) no regulation is in place and the local
government can freely choose their tolls, (ii) the federal government imposes ￿rst
best tolls but relies on the reports of the local governments since it does not have
the necessary information, (iii) the federal government has perfect knowledge
of the value of the mecc and imposes the ￿rst best tolls and (iv) the federal
government imposes a toll cap equal to the toll that maximizes the expected
federal welfare. We will call the ￿rst scenario the "laissez fair" (LF) scenario,
the second the "asymmetric information" (AI) scenario, the third one the "￿rst
best" (FB) scenario and the last one the "toll cap" (TC) scenario. We compute
the expected welfares losses for the various scenarios. The value of information
can be de￿ned as the di⁄erence between expected welfare in the FB scenario
and the expected welfare in the AI scenario.
5.1 Air pollution externality
In Table 2 we present the welfares for the federal and the local governments
for di⁄erent combinations of their true mecc and tolls (￿￿H is the ￿rst best toll
when the mecc is high, ￿￿L is the ￿rst best toll when the mecc is low and ￿N
is the toll preferred by the local government). The relative amount of transit
tra¢ c will determine whether a low region will want to misreport its mecc or
not. We will therefore consider three di⁄erent values for the ultimate share of
transit tra¢ c, ￿; in the ￿rst case 40% of the tra¢ c is transit, in the second case
80% will be transit and ￿nally in the last case all tra¢ c is transit.
We see that a region with high mecc will never have an incentive to lie: if




three cases negative). The local welfares for a region with a low mecc when it
is forced to implement the right ￿rst best toll (i.e. ￿￿L) will exceed the local
welfare given that the toll is the "wrong" ￿rst best toll (i.e. ￿￿H) only when the
share of transit is low (40%). In the other cases, a low mecc region will report
a high mecc.
5We could take the case where the low or high outcome are equally probable but since the
informational problem occurs when there is a chance of a low cost region to pretend to be
high cost we assume that there is a higher chance for the region to have a real low mecc.
2040% transit 80% transit 100% transit
Welfares Welfares Welfares
(mecc,toll) Fed Local Fed Local Fed Local
￿
eH;￿￿H￿
0:28 0:17 0:28 0:06 0:28 0 ￿
eH;￿￿L￿
￿0:50 ￿1:32 ￿0:5 ￿2:10 ￿0:5 ￿2:5 ￿
eH;￿N￿
0:26 0:20 0:23 0:16 0:21 0:14 ￿
eL;￿￿L￿
2 1:18 2 0:4 2 0 ￿
eL;￿￿H￿
1:22 1:10 1:22 0:99 1:22 0:94 ￿
eL;￿N￿
1:83 1:42 1:6 1:11 1:5 1
Table 2: Welfare when local air pollution is the only externality.
In Table 3 we report the monetary transfer needed to induce truthtelling, the
value of information and the welfare losses of the di⁄erent scenarios compared
to the ￿rst best welfare.
share of transit 40% 80% 100%
transfer (M) 0 0:59 0:94
Value of Information 0 0:625 0:625
Welfare loss from asymmetric information 0% 38% 38%
Welfare loss from Laissez Faire 8:5% 20% 25%
Welfare loss from toll cap 7:5% 7:5% 7:5%
Table 3: Results for numerical example for air pollution and both local and
transit tra¢ c
We see that, when transfers are needed, the value of information is high,
nearly 40% of the expected welfare. This re￿ ects the large di⁄erence in the
￿rst best toll levels. In these cases it can be worthwhile to invest in better
information. We can also see, however, that if the federal government would
impose a cap equal to the expected mecc instead of trying to impose ￿rst best
tolling relying on the information given by the local government, the welfare loss
would be much lower, namely 7:5%; we see that, in this case even no regulation
would perform better.
5.2 Congestion externality
Again the results will depend on the share of transit. We will consider four
cases: in the ￿rst case the share of transit is approximately 13%, in the two next
cases the total tra¢ c will consists of 33% respectively 52% of transit. In the last
columns we report the results for the case where tra¢ c consists only of transit
tra¢ c.
In the ￿rst case where 13% of the tra¢ c is transit no region has an incentive to
lie. In the other cases the low region will want to pretend having a high mecc.
The transfers needed to induce truthtelling, the value of info and welfare losses
2113% transit 33% transit 52% transit 100% transit
Welfares Welfares Welfares Welfares






























2:48 2:26 2:39 1:97 2:28 1:76 2:01 1:39
Table 4: Welfares for congestion and both local and transit tra¢ c
are summarized in the next table:
share of transit 13% 33% 52% 100%
transfer (M) 0 0:14 0:29 0:67
Value of Information 0 0:1 0:1 0:1
Welfare loss from asymmetric information 0 4:4% 4:4% 4:4%
Welfare loss from Laissez Faire 0:8% 4% 8% 18:5%
Welfare loss from toll cap 0:76% 0:76% 0:76% 0:76%
Table 5: Results for numerical example for air pollution and both local and
transit tra¢ c
The transfers listed in the above table will give a low cost region the right
incentives to report its true cost, but the transfer needed in the case half of the
tra¢ c is transit will however induce a region with a high mecc to pretend to be
low. Indeed, charging the low ￿rst best toll and receiving the transfer will yield











plus the transfer is
0:72+0:29 = 1:01 which is larger). Imposing the ￿rst best tolls will thus not be
possible. Instead of using transfers, the federal government can impose a toll
cap. The welfare losses when imposing the toll cap are again quite low.
Table 5 gives one surprising insight. Although the possibility to exploit tran-
sit tra¢ c is clearly there, the loss in welfare due to the asymmetric information
remains relatively low in the case of congestion. The value of information is
4:4%. This is clearly lower than the 38% found as value of information in the
case of air pollution. So although, in the case of congestion, no mechanism
exists to attain the First Best, the loss in welfare remains low. The intuition is
that the welfare loss when a region has a low mecc but reports a high mecc is a
function of the square of the excessive toll (di⁄erence between high ￿rst best toll
and low ￿rst best toll). In the case of air pollution the excessive toll can be quite
22high. When we deal with congestion, the high external congestion cost comes
down to a lower "excessive toll" or market distortion because the ￿rst best tolls
depends on the demand, which on its turn decreases with increasing toll. This
feedback e⁄ect reduces the e⁄ective toll needed and the high ￿rst best tolls will
be relatively smaller than in the case of an air pollution type externality. As the
welfare loss is proportional to the square of the market distortion, the welfare
loss associated to asymmetric info (and the value of info) is much larger in the
case of air pollution than in the case of congestion.
6 The European solution: a toll cap equal to the
average infrastructure costs
We have seen in the previous section that in the case of congestion (or any
kind of externalities with feedback e⁄ects) when there is transit tra¢ c, there is
no obvious way to implement ￿rst-best tolling when there is some uncertainty
about the magnitude of the externality. As announced in the introduction,
the current practice in the EU is to constrain the toll level by a toll cap which
equals the average infrastructure cost. In this section we analyze to what extent
this practice makes sense. The advantage is that such a cap does not require
any knowledge about the level of congestion and will therefore not rely on the
reporting of the marginal external costs by the regional governments. The
federal government needs only to know the total infrastructure costs and the
toll revenues. Assuming constant returns to scale in road capacity costs, the





where k is the unit cost of capacity and 1=￿ is the level of capacity. It is
cheaper to provide a highly congested or badly serviced road (low capacity, high
￿). Note that both the unit cost of capacity and the level of capacity can be
unknown to the federal government, we only assume that the total costs are
known. The toll revenues collected by the regional government can not exceed
the total infrastructure cost, so
￿X < TC:
Note that the local government has now the freedom to choose not only the toll
level ￿ but also the capacity level 1=￿ . We will see, however, that this extra
freedom generates ￿rst best results for the tolling and for capacity choices of
the local government since it will always choose the optimal level of investment
given the level of usage.
6.1 The case of only transit tra¢ c
The objective functions now include the infrastructure costs which are born by
the local government. With only transit tra¢ c, the objective function equals
23the toll revenues minus the infrastructure costs:
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6.1.1 The toll and investment level preferred by the federal govern-
ment
It is interesting to see what would happen if the federal government had the
possibility to choose toll and capacity. If this would be the case it would choose








The ￿rst f.o.c. yields the ￿rst-best toll
￿￿ = ￿XT (￿￿;￿):
The f.o.c. for ￿ can be rewritten as
￿














The higher the marginal infrastructure cost, the more congested the infrastruc-
ture will be since the government will invest less. The more transit, the more
revenues can be extracted and the more can be invested. Substituting ￿
￿ back




and this produces the well known cost-recovery result.
6.1.2 The toll and investment level preferred by the local govern-
ment
It is instructive to see what the local authority would choose as its capacity level






















Using the derivatives with respect to ￿; @X
T
@￿ = ￿ X
T
bT+￿ and substituting the




bT+￿ in the ￿rst order conditions for ￿; we










This is the optimal capacity from the federal point of view (see eq.(25)) given
the level of usage. This means that if the federal government could induce opti-
mal charging, the regional government would automatically opt for the optimal
investment level.
6.1.3 A toll cap equal to the average infrastructure cost













where ￿ is given in eq(23). It is clear that in this case the local government
will choose toll and capacity levels such that the toll revenues exactly equal the
infrastructure costs since otherwise it will have negative welfare and will choose
not to invest at all. The local government will be indi⁄erent to all pairs of tolls
and capacity levels that yield zero welfare and that satisfy ￿XT (￿;￿) = k=￿.
Using the equilibrium expression for XT = aT￿￿￿￿
￿+bT , we see that the constraint
reduces to:




so for every ￿ in a feasible range there is a ￿ that satis￿es the constraint and
there is an in￿nity of solutions that satisfy this constraint but only one is optimal
from a federal point of view.
256.2 The case of transit and local tra¢ c
6.2.1 Federal price setting
The federal optimization problem yields the same result as in the case where
there is only transit tra¢ c but now the transit ￿ ow XT is replaced by the total















6.2.2 Local pricing and investment strategy
Without regulation, the local authority would choose its investment level (￿)
and ￿ such as to maximize its welfare ￿￿ k
￿, where ￿ is given in eq(19). It has
to solve the next two equations:
@￿
@￿










































The f.o.c. for ￿ is
￿




















Again, the capacity will be set optimally. Note that the toll level is larger than
the optimum so that ￿ ows are smaller. The local authority will thus not invest
enough and charge too much.
With local tra¢ c, the local government could in principle charge tolls smaller
than the average infrastructure cost and still have positive welfare. Under the




















































where B = ￿ (bT + bL) + bTbL:
The last equation is satis￿ed when either ￿ = 0 or k
￿ ￿ ￿X = 0: It is easy
to show that when ￿ = 0 (or when the constraint is not binding), that the toll
revenues will always equal or exceed the infrastructure costs. So this leads us to








which corresponds exactly to the ￿rst best solution6. This means that when the
higher authority level has no knowledge about the marginal external congestion
cost, it can still achieve the ￿rst-best by letting the local government decide
about capacity levels and tolls, provided that the average infrastructure cost
cap holds.








In this paper it is assumed that the federal government lacks information on
the external costs created by tra¢ c.The local government knows the external
costs and uses this asymmetry in information to charge transit and local tra¢ c
more than the marginal external cost. We have shown that, if the external cost
does not a⁄ect the use of the infrastructure (as in the case of some forms of air
pollution), there exists a transfer scheme by which the federal government can
induce the local government to charge the right tolls. If monetary transfers are
not possible the federal authority can impose a toll cap equal to the expected
value of the marginal external cost. When the external cost is of the congestion
type so that the level of congestion a⁄ects the level of use, a transfer scheme
to induce the local government to implement the right toll only exists if transit
tra¢ c is not su¢ ciently important. These results are summarized in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Conditions for which a mechanism exists that induces truthfull re-
porting of the marginal social costs
Stated di⁄erently: the classic solution to asymmetric information problems,
namely proposing some transfer scheme to induce the lower level authority to
report its true marginal external cost, breaks down in the case of congestion.
The welfare loss due to this lack of information, however, turns out to be rather
small when the externality is of the congestion type. The reason is that demand
reacts to the toll and the ￿rst best toll reacts on the level of use, the level of ￿rst
best tolls will be lower than when such feedback e⁄ects are not present. This
reduces the welfare loss when charging the wrong ￿rst best toll (i.e. the ￿rst
best toll for a high mecc when the true mecc is low). For the air pollution type
of externality the excessive toll is high because, in our case, it did not depend
on the volume of tra¢ c.
In both cases one could also impose a toll cap that equals the toll that
maximizes the expected welfare. In the numerical example used in this chapter,
the welfare losses are substantially smaller with such a cap than when the federal
government tries to impose the ￿rst best but relies on the local government
signal. The current European regulation imposes a toll cap equal to the average
28infrastructure cost. This regulation turns out to perform well under certain
circumstances: if there is only type of tra¢ c and there are constant returns to
scale in capacity extension, one can achieve a ￿rst best outcome for prices and
investment by using the average infrastructure cost as toll cap.
In this paper we assumed that there is only one type of users and that
they all contribute in the same way. When transit and local tra¢ c have the
same air pollution or congestion e⁄ect, there is only one parameter that is
unknown to the federal government. The propositions derived in this paper can
be generalized to the case of several types of users if their relative contribution
to the externality is known. This would be the case if the relative emission rates
of trucks and cars is known or if the relative congestion contribution of cars and
trucks are known. Having di⁄erent types of users does however most likely
create problems to use the average infrastructure cost as toll cap. In this case
the federal government does control neither the toll nor the investment levels.
When there are more types of users the federal government can control easily the
absence of discrimination between local and transit tra¢ c for each type but this
will be insu¢ cient. Whenever the transit share of one type of users is larger,
there will be an incentive for the local government to overcharge this group.
This is a well known result in the tax exporting literature. The implication is
that the ￿rst best character of a toll cap equal to the average infrastructure cost
breaks down. To see this, take an extreme example and assume that all trucks
except one are transit trucks but that all passenger cars are local tra¢ c. Tolls
for trucks will be ine¢ ciently high and the toll cap can not prevent this and the
powerful result that using toll caps equal to the average infrastructure cost is
enough to ensure e¢ cient pricing and investment breaks down.
This paper uses a very simple model and several extensions are worth study-
ing. One extension is the use of more complex networks. The competition for
transit tra¢ c may limit the pricing power of local government levelsin the case
of parallel networks as in De Borger et al. (2007). A second extension is to con-
sider a wider range of instruments, besides transfer mechanisms and toll caps;
one may also consider quality standards for roads or uniform ￿xed tari⁄s.
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A Derivation of condition (22)
The equilibrium volume are determined by the Wardrop equilibrium concept
where
aT ￿ bTXT = ￿ + ￿
￿
XT + XL￿
+ ￿ = aL ￿ bLXL
















where BA ￿ ￿
A (bL + bT) + bLbT and A ￿ aTbL + aLbT ￿ (bT + bL)￿.
































A (bT + bL) + bLbT
(39)





















With the help of these four last equations (￿rst using eq(37) and eq(38), then
substituting eq(40) and after rearranging the terms we substitute eq(39)) we
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